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Abstract This paper examines the determinants of the timing of a monopolistic firm’s
product innovation and regulatory approval, and proposes a signaling model with en-
dogenous regulatory delay. Regulatory delay exerts a multiplier eﬀect on total time to
market, because when the firm expects the regulator to take longer to grant approval,
the firm delays its product introduction. The firm can time its innovation to communi-
cate its private information about the marginal cost of delay to the regulator. Successful
signaling in the separating equilibrium leads the regulator to reduce regulatory delay.
The implications of the model are consistent with data on innovation and regulatory
delay in telecommunications markets in a few Midwest states in the U.S.
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1 Introduction
Regulated firms often claim that regulatory review and approval of new products is costly
and distorts the incentives to innovate. Examples of regulatory delay are FDA approval
of new drugs and line-of-business restrictions in banking before deregulation. I explore
the relationship between regulatory delay and the timing of the firm’s innovation, a con-
nection largely overlooked by the literature on regulation and innovation. I focus on the
telecommunications industry. Delayed introduction of new telecommunications services
can impose large costs on society (Hausman, 1997) and it is important to understand
the determinants of delay. The model I develop recognizes that the firm may influence
regulatory delay. The timing of innovation by the firm may reveal information about
the cost of delay to the regulator, which might adjust regulatory delay in response. The
implications of the model are consistent with data on innovation and regulatory delay
in telecommunications markets in a few Midwest states.
J. Prieger
Pepperdine University School of Public Policy
24255 Pacific Coast Highway
Malibu, CA 90263-7490
E-mail: james.prieger@pepperdine.edu
2Both firms and regulators contribute to the delay between technological feasibility of
a product and its introduction to consumers. The time between the first technologically
feasible introduction date and the submission of the product to the regulator is innova-
tion delay. The time between the firm’s submission of a new product to the regulator
for approval and the granting of approval is regulatory delay. The data examined here
show that regulatory delay is positively correlated with innovation delay at the level of
the individual product. There are many potential explanations of the correlation. The
explanation developed here is that regulators delay a service based on the cost of so
doing (other explanations are considered in Section 6). Whether the regulator has full
or incomplete information regarding the cost of delay to the firm, there is a positive
association between regulatory and innovation delay in equilibrium. In the asymmetric
information model, the firm signals its private information to the regulator through its
innovation delay.
In the model, the regulator trades oﬀ the benefit of reducing delay (quicker return on
investment for the firm and earlier accrual of benefits for consumers) and the costs (loss
of regulatory control, potentially lower quality of service, harm to competing firms, and
the like). Examples of the cost to the regulator of quick introduction include the fallout
from consumer confusion from introducing a product before agreement on a technical
standard or loss of payoﬀs (perhaps intangible) from interest groups opposing the firm.
These costs enter the model as a regulatory “taste for delay”.1 Instead of looking at the
political economy of regulatory delay, I take the regulator’s preferences as exogenous
and merely note that given the lengthy regulatory delay exhibited in the data analyzed
here, there must be a strong taste for delay.
The trade-oﬀ between the costs and benefits of regulatory delay depends in part on
the cost that regulatory delay imposes on the firm. The firm is likely to know better
the cost of delay than the regulator does. Unless the firm has the lowest possible delay
cost, it would like to communicate its private information to the regulator. The firm can
signal its cost of delay with an action that a firm with diﬀerent cost cannot profitably
mimic. A costly action available to the firm is innovation delay. In particular, innovating
sooner than the full-information optimal delay signals the regulator that cost is high.
Of course, the firm would also attempt to convince the regulator that the product is
important through other forms of communication such as cost and demand reports.
However, if the cost to the firm of sending such reports does not vary with the true type
of the firm and verification is diﬃcult, they may not be credible.
This article breaks new ground by jointly modeling the determination of regula-
tory and innovation delay. The earliest literature on regulation and the timing of in-
novation looked at a monopolist’s incentive to innovate given a fixed regulatory regime
(Braeutigam, 1979).2 More recent work focuses on the strategic timing of innovation un-
der diﬀerent regulatory regimes (Riordan, 1992; Lyon and Huang, 1995), but does not
explicitly consider regulatory delay. The empirical literature on how regulatory delay
aﬀects innovation and product introduction is small. It includes Gruber and Verboven
(2001), Prieger (2001, 2002a, 2002b), and Hazlett and Ford (2001), all for the telecom-
munications industry, Prager (1989) for electricity generation, and Sanyal (2003) for
the electronics and three other industries. In work related to the present study, Prieger
(2007) shows that reduction in average regulatory delay contributed toward speedier
product introductions. In that study, unlike the present one, regulatory delay is treated
1 Sometimes delay stems from judicial rather than regulatory action. The arbiter of the Modified Final
Judgement (MFJ) that split up AT&T, Judge Harold Greene, prohibited the dominant phone companies
from oﬀering information services even longer than the FCC wished. See chapter 12 of Brock (1994) for
evidence that loss of regulatory control enters negatively into at least some objective functions.
2 The literature review here and the description of the data in Section 4 draw on Prieger (2007).
3as fixed or random. There are two diﬀerences between the extant literature and the
present work. Previous studies all focus on aspects other than asymmetric information
and signaling. Furthermore, in the empirical studies among the above, regulatory delay
is an explanatory variable, rather than the dependent variable as modeled here. In one of
the few other papers on signaling in a regulated environment, Spiegel and Wilkie (1996)
consider a model in which firms signal to the capital market (not the regulator) through
investment in a new technology. The model here thus oﬀers a new role that signaling
can play in regulated markets.
In the next section, I present the theoretical model. I give an example highlighting
how the firm’s and the regulator’s strategies are formed in Section 3. In Section 4, I
present the testable implications derived from the signaling model and introduce the
data from a large incumbent local exchange telephone company. I test the predictions in
Section 5 and show that the signaling model is consistent with the observed patterns of
innovation delay and regulatory delay. I consider alternative explanations in Section 6,
and conclude by discussing welfare implications and possible extensions to the model.
2 The Model
The firm’s side of the model is an extension of that in Prieger (2007), to which I add
heterogeneity of firms and endogenous regulatory delay. The firm first chooses its inno-
vation date and then the regulator chooses an amount of additional delay. Time t = 0
is when a firm can first feasibly introduce a given product. Both the firm and the reg-
ulator observe t, which is required for innovation delay to function as a signal to the
regulator. While in some settings the regulator may not know when products are tech-
nologically feasible, I argue below that the regulator can observe a proxy for t in the
data examined here. The firm chooses to submit the product to the regulator for ap-
proval at time s ≥ 0, at which time it incurs fixed cost F (s). F may include the cost of
development, adoption, or regulatory filing, and (as in Riordan (1992)) is a decreasing
function of time. In dynamic industries such as telecommunications, it is realistic to
assume that technological advances lower the cost of implementing the new service over
time. I assume F 0(t) < 0 and F 00(t) > 0, and all functions in the model are assumed to
be continuous and diﬀerentiable as needed. Falling fixed costs give the firm a reason to
delay innovation.
The regulator approves the service after regulatory delay of length a. Regulatory
delay may include time spent getting on the regulator’s docket, waiting for a monthly
review meeting, and mandatory examination periods. The firm oﬀers the good for pur-
chase at introduction time s+ a. I assume that the regulator cannot commit to a policy
a before the firm moves.3 The firm earns flow profit of π(θ) per unit time after intro-
duction, where θ is a parameter that may be private information of the firm.4 There is a
continuum of possible types, drawn from a compact set: θ ∈ [θ−, θ+] ⊂ R. I assume that
π0(θ) > 0, so larger θ might correspond to higher demand or to lower marginal costs. In
order to focus on the strategic variable s, the determination of price (and therefore π)
is taken to be unrelated to the introduction time in the model and is not modeled. The
firm’s net present value of introduction at time s, given discount rate is r, is:









3 Lack of commitment is a common assumption in regulatory games (outside of the mechanism design
literature). See Spiegel and Spulber (1997) for a justification.
4 The timing of the model is similar to that of Braeutigam (1979).
4I assume that for all firm types an interior maximum of Π in s exists for all a.5 Since
delay postpones the accrual of flow profit, and the firm’s type is positively related to
π, the firm’s private information about θ can be interpreted as information about the
firm’s opportunity cost of delay.
Regulatory delay has no benefit for the firm in this model:
Proposition 1 ∂Π/∂a < 0. Longer regulatory delay lowers the firm’s profit.
From (1), ∂Π/∂a = −e−r(s+a)π(θ) < 0. Although one can conceive of situations in
which regulatory delay can turn out to be beneficial ex post, the firm views regulatory
delay as purely detrimental. Given that a firm could always choose on its own to de-
lay introducing a product, it is hard to imagine realistic cases where regulatory delay
enhances the profit of the firm.
Timing of the game The firm first chooses s. The regulator observes s, updates its beliefs
about the firm’s type θ, and chooses delay a. Because the regulator makes its decision
after the firm’s, the firm can signal its type to influence regulatory delay.
The regulator’s objective function may represent either social welfare (the “benevo-
lent dictator” framework) or the utility function of the regulator (the “economic theory
of regulation” approach to regulation (Peltzman, 1976)). Utility at time s when the
regulator believes the firm to be of type θˆ is
U(θˆ, a) =W (a, θˆ) + V (a) (2)
The first part of the utility function, W , comes from the profit of the firm and the
consumers’ surplus. In the simplest case, W is the sum of the present discounted value
of total welfare. Other transformations of profit and consumers’ surplus are allowed, but
it is assumed that ∂W/∂a < 0, ∂W/∂θˆ > 0, ∂2W/∂a2 > 0, and ∂2W/∂a∂θˆ < 0. These
assumptions are consistent withW = Π+CS, where CS is the present discounted value
of a constant surplus flow that is increasing in θ. The firm’s type aﬀects CS at least
indirectly because the monopoly prices charged are a function of θ. If θ represents a
demand parameter, then θ will also have a direct impact on CS.
Crucial to the model is V , the benefit to the regulator from regulatory delay, with
V 0 > 0 and V 00 < 0. The interpretation of V varies with the interpretation of the
regulator’s objective. In a benevolent dictator setting, V may represent benefits not
reflected in CS as defined above from higher quality or lower level of externalities that
may result from regulatory delay. If delay represents the time taken by the firm to
bring the product up to a regulatory quality standard, then longer delays may increase
product quality. If delay represents time taken by the regulator to investigate safety or
privacy concerns (e.g., caller ID or caller ID blocking), then longer delays may decrease
externalities. In these cases, CS is read as surplus conditional on a fixed level of quality
or externalities, and V subsumes all benefits of delay. In a political economy setting, V
might represent a preference for exercising authority or direct or indirect payoﬀs to the
regulator from the firm’s rivals (although any such rivals are not modeled explicitly here).
This “taste for delay” in the model, although ad hoc, is clearly realistic. Examination
of the data below shows that regulatory delay is often quite lengthy in the real world,
and therefore regulators must perceive there to be benefits of some sort to delay. For
modeling purposes, all that is needed is a regulatory objective function that leads to
non-zero regulatory delay.
5 I assume rF (0)− F 0(0) > e−raπ(θ) for all θ and a to guarantee positive optimal innovation delay
s∗, and that limt→∞ rF (t)− F 0(t) ≤ 0 to guarantee finite s∗.
5For simplicity, the benefit to the regulator from regulatory delay is not a function of
the firm’s type. While the profitability of the proposed service may realistically aﬀect V ,
especially if payoﬀs from the firm’s rivals to the regulator are involved, making V depend
explicitly on θˆ complicates some proofs unnecessarily.6 Finally, it is required that the
concavity of V be great enough in magnitude so that ∂2U/∂a2 < 0. This assumption,
for technical convenience, assures that the relevant single-crossing condition holds. Note
finally that U is forward looking or “memoryless” in the sense that s does not aﬀect U .
This assumption means the regulator treats innovation delay as a bygone by the time
its decision is to be made, and simplifies some of the results but is not intrinsic to the
argument.
Solution concept I restrict focus in this Spence-type signaling game to cases of successful
signaling: sequential separating equilibria. As will be shown, equilibrium in the model
is unique and consists of pure strategies, and so I do not discuss mixed strategies here.
Equilibrium consists of the firm’s one-to-one strategy σ(θ) for s, and the regulator’s
strategy α(θˆ, s) for a, and the regulator’s posterior beliefs θˆ about θ such that
— σ(θ) maximizes Π(θ, s, a) given the firm’s correct expectation that a = α(θ, s),
— α(θˆ) maximizes U(θˆ, a) given the posterior beliefs and the regulator’s correct expec-
tation that s = σ(θˆ), and
— θˆ = θ on the equilibrium path.7
Mailath (1987) shows that when type space is continuous, a unique separating equi-
librium exists if certain technical conditions are met, which I discuss below and in the
appendix.
The regulator’s strategy Because equilibrium is sequentially rational, we may use back-




when it believes the firm is type θˆ. Assuming an interior solution (α > 0), the optimal
choice of regulatory delay α equates the marginal benefit of delay for the regulator with
the regulator’s marginal cost of delay:















which, by the assumptions above, is negative. Figure 1 shows a typical case. The firm
knows it will receive lower regulatory delay the higher the regulator thinks θ is. Thus,
the worst belief the regulator can hold, from the firm’s point of view, is that θ = θ−.
All firm types other than θ− therefore wish to signal to the regulator to avoid the worst
outcome, α(θ−).
6 If V depends on θˆ, then as long as ∂2U/∂θˆ∂a < 0, no results change.
7 More formally, strategies and beliefs are sequentially rational and consistent in the sense of Kreps
and Wilson (1982). Sequential equilibrium in this game may impose more restrictions on play oﬀ the
equilibrium path than does the more familiar perfect Bayesian equilibrium, because there are more than
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Fig. 1 The regulator’s optimal strategy for regulatory delay
The firm’s strategy Following Mailath (1987), define the firm’s concentrated profit func-
tion as
Π˜(θ, θˆ, s) = Π(θ, s, α(θˆ)) (6)
The function is concentrated in the sense that Π˜ incorporates the optimal action of the
regulator. Given the assumptions, Π˜ satisfies a single crossing condition for θ:
∂Π˜(θ, θˆ, s)/∂s
∂Π˜(θ, θˆ, s)/∂θˆ
is strictly monotonically decreasing in θ. (7)
The single crossing condition for θ, proved in the appendix, means that strengthening
the signal is costlier for firms with higher costs of delay. The condition implies that the
firm’s strategy will be monotone in θ.
If the firm’s type were observable to the regulator, then the firm would choose its
optimal innovation delay as
s∗ = τ(θ) = argmax
s
Π˜(θ, θ, s) (8)
The function τ is the full-information benchmark strategy for innovation delay.
Given that the firm’s type is likely to be private information, the firm may wish to
communicate its type to the regulator. Looking ahead to the regulator’s policy α(θˆ), the
firm wishes to signal its type when doing so will cause the regulator to reduce regulatory
delay from α(θ−). Thus, τ(θ) = σ(θ), where σ is the firm’s signaling strategy for s, only
at θ = θ−. The type with the lowest cost of delay has no incentive to signal, which
provides an initial value condition needed to solve for the equilibrium strategy below.
If σ(θ) is part of a separating equilibrium, it must be one-to-one and incentive com-
patible. Incentive compatibility requires that the firm maximize Π˜ recognizing that the
regulator will correctly infer its type (in equilibrium): if the firm chooses delay s, the
regulator will correctly believe that the firm’s type is σ−1(s). Mathematically, incentive
compatibility requires that
















Fig. 2 The firm’s optimal strategy for innovation delay
Mailath (1987) shows that under condition (7) and other regularity conditions satisfied
here (see the appendix) a unique, continuous, strictly monotonic pure strategy σ(θ)










σ(θ−) = τ(θ−) (11)
Given the assumptions of the model, dσ/dθ < 0 and σ is below τ to the right of θ−
(see Proposition 4 in the appendix). In Figure 2, which shows a typical case, the firm’s
full-information strategy is the heavy line and the signaling strategy is the lighter line
below. The economic interpretation of the firm’s behavior at θ−, where the slope of σ
approaches infinity, is that types marginally higher than θ− must decrease innovation
delay a lot to diﬀerentiate themselves from the worst type. The derivative of σ, although
still negative, is not as large for higher types. In all cases, however, the innovation delay
chosen by the firm is less than that chosen in the full-information case. This is the cost
of signaling for the firm. As one expects in a signaling model, the firm earns less profit
compared to the full-information case. Note, however, that consumers receive the new
service earlier when the firm has private information.
Since dσ/dθ < 0, it follows that a higher opportunity cost of delay induces the firm to
innovate earlier. This result is not caused by the need to signal; it can be shown (or seen
from Figure 2) that dτ/dθ < 0 also. At first, this result might appear counterintuitive; if
regulation is undesirable for the firm, why do higher marginal costs of regulatory delay
lead to earlier innovation? The answer requires distinguishing between the direct and
opportunity costs of regulation. Type θ measures the opportunity costs of regulation;
as the forgone profit from delay increases, the firm innovates earlier to speed accrual of
those profits. If the direct cost of the regulatory process were included as a constant in
F , then an increase in direct cost would postpone innovation since the marginal benefit














Fig. 3 The equilibrium relationship between regulatory and innovation delay
The central result is that innovation delay and regulatory delay move together in
equilibrium:
Proposition 2 da/ds > 0 in equilibrium. Regulatory delay is positively associated with
innovation delay in the equilibrium of the signaling model.
The proposition follows formally from the theory of supermodular games,8 which
shows that s and a are both decreasing in the firm’s type, and which has already been
shown above. Thus, in equilibrium, low types lead to high regulatory and innovation de-
lay, and high types lead to low innovative and regulatory delay. The empirical implication
is the following. Innovation delay and discretionary regulatory delay will be correlated
in a sample of observations on the outcome of this one-shot game, since (ceteris paribus)
s and a would move together.
In addition to positive association between innovation delay and regulatory delay,
the model also predicts that the relationship is concave:
Proposition 3 da/ds is decreasing in a neighborhood to the left of α(θ−) in equilibrium.
Regulatory delay is concave in innovation delay in the equilibrium of the signaling model,
at least in that region.
The proof is in the appendix. The proposition states that marginal increases in
innovation delay prompt diminishing marginal increases in regulatory delay, as can be
readily seen in Figure 3. Concavity of regulatory delay is thus a necessary implication
of signaling, and may be used to distinguish signaling from full-information behavior in
an empirical investigation, since concavity need not hold in the full-information case.
8 See, e.g., Topkis (1998), Lemma 4.2.2.
93 An Example
Consider the following example to illustrate the results of the signaling model. Assume
these functional forms
W (a, θˆ) = θˆ exp(−r [a¯+ a]) (12)
V (a) = − exp(−2ra)/2 (13)
π(θ) = rθ (14)
F (s) = e−s (15)
which satisfy the needed conditions given above. The parameter a¯ in (12) represents a
minimum level of delay required of all services. Thus, a¯ represents structural, exogenous
delay, which is fixed before the game begins.
The regulator’s best response is found from (4) as
α(θˆ) = a¯− ln θˆ
r
(16)
and the firm’s best response under full information is found from (8) as




When signaling is necessary in the separating equilibrium, (10) and (11) define the firm’s
strategy. This initial value problem does not have an analytic solution, but is readily
solved by numerical methods. For example, set θ− = 0.1, θ+ = 1, a¯ = 20, and r = 0.1.
The regulator’s strategy for this case is the one depicted in Figure 1, the firm’s full-
information (the heavy line) and signaling strategies are the ones depicted in Figure
2, and the equilibrium relationship between regulatory and innovation delay is the one
shown in Figure 3. The relationship between a and s for the full-information case is
linear in this example:
α(τ−1(s)) =
s+ ln r − ln (r + 1)
2r
(18)
For the signaling case, in the function α(σ−1(s)) a given regulatory delay results in
longer regulatory delay, compared with the full-information case. This follows directly
from Figure 2, because regulatory delay depends only on the type of the firm, and
a given type signals with an s shorter than it would like to absent signaling. Note
that the sign of the relationship between regulatory and innovation delay is positive in
both the full-information and signaling cases. However, Proposition 3 applies only to
the signaling model: α(σ−1(s)) is concave but α(τ−1(s)) is not. Therefore, the sign of
correlation between regulatory and innovation delay observed in data from a regulated
industry may be used to distinguish strategic from non-strategic or random behavior,
but concavity must be tested to distinguish between the full-information and signaling
cases.
4 Data and Discussion of the Tests
The theoretical model places restrictions on the relationship between regulatory and
innovation delay. First, from Proposition (2) regulatory delay rises with innovation delay.
Proposition 3 further asserts that regulatory delay is concave in innovation delay. Note
that tests of these predictions are non-parametric, in the sense that the tests depend only
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Sample Innovation Delay Regulatory Delay
State N min mean median max min mean median max
IL 95 0 82 1 824 1 33 46 248
IN 69 0 206 53 1,996 1 33 3 217
WI 103 0 191 39 2,441 1 33 10 752
Total 267 0 156 32 2,441 1 33 10 752
Table notes: figures are in days. See text for calculation of innovation delay.
Table 1 Summary statistics for delay
on the sign or shape of the correlation between the observed regulatory and innovation
delay, and no specific functional forms need be assumed for π, W , or V .
The data are the innovation and introduction dates for every telecommunications
service introduced 1991-1999 by Ameritech in Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin.9 These
data are a subset of those used by Prieger (2007) for other purposes. Ameritech, one
of the Bell regional holding companies and later acquired by SBC (now AT&T), is the
dominant local service provider in each of these states, and its intrastate activities are
regulated by the state commissions. The firm could oﬀer the new services to subscribers
until the state public utility commission granted regulatory approval. Examples of the
residential and business services in the data are new voice mail features, virtual network-
ing services, and high-speed transmission services. From 1991 until mid 1994, Ameritech
was under rate of return regulation in Illinois and Indiana, while in Wisconsin the firm
was allowed some earnings and pricing flexibility (Roycroft, 1999). In 1994, each state
switched to price cap regulation.
I take the date at which Ameritech first introduced a service in any of these states
or in the FCC’s access tariﬀ to be t = 0, and then measure innovation delay s for the
other states relative to the first state’s innovation date. This may underestimate true
innovation delay: the true time 0 must be weakly before the observed first “innovation”
under this definition. However, time elapsed before the first tariﬀ cannot serve as a signal
because the regulator does not observe it. Thus, my measurement of s corresponds to
the useful part (for signaling) of innovation delay, and therefore corresponds to s as
used in the model.10 The data include new services introduced in at least two states.
Regulatory delay a for a service is the time from the submission of the first tariﬀ filing
to the approval of the last filing.11
Summary statistics for regulatory delay are in Table 1. The modal value for innova-
tion delay is zero, and in most states delay of both types is right skewed, which aﬀects
the choice of empirical specification described in the next section. Prieger (2007) more
extensively documents that innovation delay varied greatly among states and regulatory
regimes, which provides good variation in this variable for the estimations here. The
diﬀerence between Prieger (2007) and the present study is the focus: in the former, inno-
vation delay is the dependent variable and the expected regulatory delay or regulatory
uncertainty of the regime are the key regressors; in the present work, service-specific reg-
ulatory delay is the dependent variable and innovation delay is the explanatory variable
of interest.
9 The data are from the tariﬀs and the tariﬀ filing logs of the company and the state commissions.
10 A caveat is that Ameritech also operated in Michigan. New services were eﬀectively deregulated in
Michigan and were not tariﬀed. It is unclear whether regulators in the other states observed introductions
in Michigan.
11 Some services had multiple tariﬀ filings and withdrawals before approval was granted in a state.
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We may observe spurious positive correlation between innovation delay and discre-
tionary regulatory delay if services diﬀer in the complexity of implementation. If so, the
firm may delay filing for approval as it works out technical issues, and the regulator may
delay approval as it reviews the complex issues raised. Correlation between s and a would
be positive, but not for any reason coming from the theoretical model. To control for
the complexity of a new service oﬀering, I use as a proxy the rank of the introduction of
a service among the various states.12 The notion of learning by doing motivates the use
of the order of introduction to reveal complexity of product implementation. Ameritech
gains experience each time it introduces a particular service in another state. Thus, the
first introduction may be the most complex. Similarly, regulators in subsequent states
can learn from the experience of regulators in previous states, as they examine the is-
sues that were raised and their resolution during previous approval processes. Thus, the
complexity of the regulatory approval process should also decrease in subsequent states.
Of course, the rank of a state in the order of introduction is not unrelated to innovation
delay: longer delay in a state increases the likelihood that introduction is later than in
other states. However, in estimations including the rank of introduction as a control,
I already control directly for innovation delay. The rank therefore communicates extra
information about complexity not captured by innovation delay. The idea: given two
distinct services with equal innovation delay, regulatory approval is more complex on
average for a novel service than for a service already introduced elsewhere in neighboring
jurisdictions.
Finally, note that the condition of concavity implied by Proposition 3 is necessary
for the signaling model but not the full-information model (as may be seen from Figure
3). Thus, rejecting concavity of regulatory delay in innovation delay would reject the
signaling model but not the full-information model.
5 Results of the Empirical Tests
The goal of the empirical work is to test the predictions from the model. To examine
how regulatory delay a responds to innovation delay s, I perform semiparametric Cox
estimations for regulatory delay where innovation delay for the service is included as a
regressor. The hazard rate of the duration of innovation delay in the Cox model is
λ(t, xi) = exp (x0iβ)λ0(t), (19)
where λ0 is an arbitrary, unspecified baseline hazard and xi is a vector of regressors
for duration i.13 Positive coeﬃcients for β increase the hazard and therefore decrease
mean duration. By including innovation delay as a regressor, I assume it is exogenous
or predetermined with respect to regulatory delay. The assumption of exogeneity may
not hold if behind-the-scenes negotiations between the firm and the regulator jointly
determine observed regulatory and innovation delay. For example, the firm could agree
not to submit a product for approval until the regulator gathers information on the
relevant issues, shortening observed regulatory delay. However, such maneuvering would
induce negative correlation between regulatory and innovation delay, the opposite of
what I find. I return to the issue of endogeneity below.
I first allow s to enter the hazard specification in a flexibly parametric way with cubic
p-splines (Eilers and Marx, 1996). Figure 4 shows the partial eﬀect of introduction delay
12 Tariﬀ filings from Ohio, another Ameritech state, are included in the calculation of the order statistic
(and the innovation delay), and so the variable ranges from one to four. Ohio is not included in the
main data set because regulatory delay data are unavailable.
13 The Cox (1972; 1975) model uses a
√
N-consistent partial likelihood method to estimate β.
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on estimated mean regulatory delay.14 The graph omits the top 10% of the outlying
introduction delays (20 observations), since the data are sparse there and the standard
error band is wide. The figure reveals that increasing introduction delay increases the
hazard rate for regulatory delay, at least through 90% of the data range. Furthermore,
the relationship between innovation and regulatory delay is concave, as predicted by
Proposition 3. The concavity is not an artifact of the specification, because innovation
delay enters the hazard specification eﬀectively nonparametrically in the estimation.
To assess statistical significance, I turn now to Cox models in which innovation delay
enters the hazard in a simpler fashion. Based on the previous analysis, in the rest of
the Cox models introduction delay enters the regression function non-linearly. I include
an indicator variable for no innovation delay, because 35% of the observations are zero.
For positive innovation delay, I include a two-part spline with the knot at the median
innovation delay.15 Estimation 1 in Table 2 includes innovation delay, along with state-
specific indicators for the years of price cap regulation. The latter remove diﬀerences
in average regulatory delay across states and regimes. The estimation is stratified by
state, which allows the baseline hazard to vary in shape and level without restriction
across states. Standard errors are clustered to allow for arbitrary correlation among the
observations in diﬀerent states for the same service. The χ2 statistic for the significance
of the regressors is very large, and a test of the Cox model’s assumed proportional
hazards in (19) does not indicate any misspecification (see table notes for details).
Proposition 2 states that there must be a positive relationship between a and s.
The coeﬃcients for the innovation delay spline are both negative in all specifications in
Table 2, implying that the hazard rate for regulatory delay decreases (and average delay
increases) as innovation delay increases. For estimation 1, the estimates imply that if
innovation delay rises from its mean value by one standard deviation, then regulatory
delay increases by 7 days. The coeﬃcients are not individually significant, but in the next
section, I find better evidence for the hypotheses in question with tests that are more
powerful. The signs of the innovation delay coeﬃcients are robust to various changes
in the controls used. In estimation 2 in Table 2, the stratification by state is replaced
with state-specific political economy variables used in other studies of regulatory change
(Donald and Sappington, 1997): the log annual budget of the regulatory authority, an
indicator for Republican control of both houses of the state legislature and a Republican
governor (Republican), and the average value of Republican from 1984 up to the previous
year (Republican history).16 These variables are the same for all observations within a
particular state and year (although they can change for durations that span years),
and help control for possible omitted factors due to the political and regulatory climate
that aﬀect regulatory delay. These three coeﬃcients are jointly significant, but there
is evidence the Cox model is misspecified. In any event, the coeﬃcients for innovation
delay change little from estimation 1.
In estimation 3, the first specification is repeated including the observation’s rank
in the order of introduction of that particular service across the states. As discussed
above, the rank proxies the unobserved complexity of the service. One expects that
holding the length of innovation delay constant, services introduced in later states are
less complex and should be approved quicker. This is indeed what estimation 3 reveals
14 Figure 4 is based on a penalized Cox regression where indicators for the incentive regulation periods
in each state are also included.
15 If a second knot is added at the third quartile, the slope coeﬃcient for the third piece of the spline
does not diﬀer significantly from the second piece.
16 The other political economy variable used in Donald and Sappington (1997), an indicator for elected
public utility commissioners, can not be used here because commissioners are not elected in any state.
Other variables I explored included the size of the PUC staﬀ and the political composition of the





































































Fig. 4 Eﬀect of innovation delay on regulatory delay (cubic p-splines)
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Cox Proportional Hazards Models for Regulatory Delay
Estimation 1 Estimation 2 Estimation 3
coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e.
Innovation delay = 0 −0.449 0.339 −0.528 0.392 −0.344 0.516
∈ [1,median] (×1000) −4.510 10.40 −4.160 11.90 −7.560 11.60
> median (×1000) −0.379∗ 0.224 −0.380 0.266 −0.486∗∗ 0.192
IL:incentive reg 0.212 0.190 0.224 0.243 0.168 0.203
IN:incentive reg 1.669∗∗∗ 0.301 1.958∗∗∗ 0.357 1.420∗∗∗ 0.326
WI:incentive reg 1.855∗∗∗ 0.348 1.484∗∗∗ 0.195 1.566∗∗∗ 0.396
Order: second 0.149 0.380
Order: third 0.450 0.388
Order: fourth 1.047∗∗∗ 0.382
PUC budget 1.574∗∗∗ 0.583
Republican −0.090 0.161
Republican history 0.662 0.649
Stratification by state none by state
N 267 267 246
χ2 statistic (d.o.f.) 55.7 (6) p = 0.00 81.9 (9) p = 0.00 120.6 (9) p = 0.00
T (G) statistic (d.o.f.) 4.85 (6) p = 0.56 17.60 (9) p = 0.04 9.3 (9) p = 0.41
Log likelihood −914.6 −1194.2 −821.1
* = 10% level significance; ** = 5% level significance; *** = 1% level significance.
Table notes: The model incorporates time-varying covariates. Larger positive coeﬃcients imply shorter
delays. PUC budget is the log budget of the state public utility commission. Republican is an indicator
for a Republican governor and majority in both houses of the state legislature. Republican history is
the average value of Republican from 1984 to the previous year of the observation. χ2 statistic is for
the null hypothesis that all coeﬃcients are zero. Figures in parentheses are degrees of freedom. T (G)
statistic is for a global test of the proportional hazards assumption and has a χ2 distribution; rejection
indicates the model is misspecified (test 4 of Grambsch and Therneau (1994)). Std. errors are robust to
clustering on services.
Table 2 Semiparametric estimation results for regulatory delay a
in Table 2: the hazard rate increases monotonically with the introduction order of the
service, implying that the average regulatory delay time decreases as the rank increases.
More importantly, for the purposes of testing the theoretical model, the coeﬃcients on
the innovation delay variables remain negative. Taken together, the evidence from all
estimations suggests that greater innovation delay is positively associated with greater
discretionary regulatory delay, in accordance with the prediction of the model. If order
is added to estimation 2, similar results obtain.
The relationship between regulatory and innovation delay is concave (i.e., a piecewise
linear approximation of concavity) in all estimations. Figure 5 plots expected regulatory
delay as a function of innovation delay, using the coeﬃcients estimated in models 1—
3.17 Thus, the data are in accord with the prediction from Proposition 3. Concavity
is a necessary implication of the signaling model, but nonconcavity is not a necessary
implication of the full-information model in general (although it is for the example
in Section 3), so that finding concavity suggests but does not prove that the firm is
signaling.
I return now to the potential endogeneity of innovation delay in these estimations.
Although innovation delay fully precedes regulatory delay by definition, there may be
17 Mean regulatory delay is calculated as the average across the sample of the predicted mean dura-
tions. Predicted durations are computed from the estimated survival curves using actual covariates and





























Fig. 5 Eﬀect of innovation delay on regulatory delay (linear splines)
unobserved factors that contribute jointly to the determination of regulatory and in-
novation delay. If so, the relationship between regulatory and innovation delay is not
causal. For example, in the full-information version of the model above, positive corre-
lation is induced between regulatory and innovation delay only through the unobserved
(to the econometrician) cost of delay. Endogeneity of covariates in a Cox model raises
some subtle statistical issues and there is no analog to instrumental variables (IV),18
so I investigate the potential endogeneity of regulatory delay with linear OLS and IV
models. I instrument for innovation delay with an indicator variable that is one if delay
is calculated from the federal access tariﬀ (FAT ) and zero if delay is calculated from
the first state tariﬀ. Prieger (2007) shows that FAT is highly significant with a large
eﬀect in estimations with innovation delay as the dependent variable, so the instrument
is relevant. The exclusion restriction for IV requires that FAT be uncorrelated with the
unobserved determinant of regulatory delay. FAT indicates that the service appears in
the federal tariﬀ before in a state tariﬀ, and there is no reason to expect FAT to be
correlated with regulatory delay after controlling for innovation delay.
The exclusion restriction is not formally testable here, because the IV model is just
identified with the single instrument. However, if FAT is added to the estimations in
Table 2, it is never significant, even at the 20% level. Further informal evidence for the
exclusion restriction comes from assessing how balanced the other observed covariates
from the regulatory delay model are with respect to FAT. Altonji, Elder and Taber (2000)
explore using the relationship between an instrument and the observables as a guide to
how much correlation there may be with the unobservable error in the outcome equation.
In the ideal case where the instrument is randomly assigned, the instrument would show
no correlation with either the other covariates or the error term. Two-sample tests per-
formed independently for the covariates order, PUC budget, Republican, and Republican
history, where the samples are split according to the value of FAT for the observation,
18 If introduction delay is endogenous, the Cox estimations are still consistent for β in the hazard
rate in (19). However, the hazard rate would no longer be interpretable as the probability of regulatory
approval conditional on the covariates (Lancaster, 1990, sec. 2.3 and 9.2.).
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generally failed to show any significant diﬀerences in means.19 I also examined the dis-
tribution of the martingale residuals from Estimation 3, separated by value of FAT.
Testing reveals no significant diﬀerence between the distributions of the residuals for the
two values of FAT–further corroboration that FAT is not correlated with unobserved
determinants of regulatory delay.20 FAT should also be correlated highly enough with
innovation delay to avoid the problems for inference that weak instruments can cause.
The partial F statistic for FAT in the first stage regression of innovation delay on all the
exogenous variables in the model is 16.2 (p-value= 0.0001), which is not in the region
that the literature on weak instruments suggests may lead to non-negligible finite sample
bias and artificially small standard errors in the second stage estimation (Staiger and
Stock, 1997).
The results from the OLS and IV estimations of regulatory delay on innovation delay
are in Table 3. Given that only one instrument is available, innovation delay enters the
mean linearly, without the spline used in Estimations 1—3. Furthermore, since there is no
additional instrument for the indicator for zero innovation delay, those observations are
dropped. In the OLS estimation, the coeﬃcients have signs in accord with Estimation
3, the analogous specifications from the Cox models.21 Innovation delay is associated
with longer regulatory delay, albeit only at the 10% significance level (probably due to
the smaller sample size and linear constraint on how delay enters the mean). In the IV
estimation, the coeﬃcient for innovation delay switches sign but is insignificant. The
purpose of the IV estimation is to test for the endogeneity of innovation delay. The
bottom of Table 3 shows test statistics and p-values for the Hausman tests. The tests do
not come close to rejecting the null hypothesis that innovation delay is exogenous in the
OLS estimation, whether performed on the delay coeﬃcient only or all coeﬃcients. The
conclusion, then, is that there is no evidence for the endogeneity of innovation delay in
the regulation delay estimations.
To conclude the test of the predictions of the theoretical model, I summarize the evi-
dence presented with a suite of hypothesis tests. Table 4 reports results from estimations
1—3, where the tests are for da/ds ≤ 0, which would violate Proposition 2. The test is
implemented for individual coeﬃcients with the null hypothesis that the coeﬃcients for
the spline in innovation delay are non-negative. Thus, under the null, the hazard rate
for endogenous regulation delay stays the same or increases (or, equivalently, regulation
delay does not increase) as innovation delay increases. Although all the spline coeﬃcients
are negative, the hypothesis is not rejected for β1, the spline coeﬃcient for innovation
delay less than the median. However, it is rejected for β2, the coeﬃcient for longer delay.
Thus, the best evidence that innovation and regulation delay move together is found
when innovation delay is longer than usual. Innovation delays are much more spread out
in the upper quartiles (e.g., the median is 35 days but the third quartile is 145 days);
perhaps unusually long delays signal more eﬀectively because they catch the eye of the
regulator more. I also report joint tests at the bottom of the table. The hypothesis that
the innovation delay coeﬃcients are zero is rejected at the 10% level in four out of six
cases (three out of six cases at the 5% level) in joint tests.
19 The one exception, curiously, is Republican, for which the test returns a p-value of 0.043. The tests
are performed via a Welch two-sample t-test without assuming the variances of the two sample are
equal. The test for Republican is not significant at the 5% level if equal variances are assumed.
20 The residuals were tested with a two-sample diﬀerence-in-means t-test and a two-sample
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of the distributions; neither test rejected the null that the resid-
uals have the same distribution for the two values of FAT.
21 The Cox models are for the hazard rate and the OLS model is for mean duration, so a negative
coeﬃcient in Table 2 accords with a positive coeﬃcient in Table 3.
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Linear Models for Regulatory Delay
OLS IV
coef. s.e. coef. s.e.
Constant 44.24∗∗∗ 11.09 49.01∗∗∗ 12.33
Introduction delay (×1000) 11.88∗ 6.691 −11.21 22.42
IL:reg change −9.155 10.88 −12.06 11.61
IN:reg change −86.20∗∗∗ 13.33 −87.22∗∗∗ 13.87
WI:reg change −34.56∗∗∗ 9.576 −33.30∗∗∗ 10.01
Indiana 61.75∗∗∗ 15.15 63.72∗∗∗ 15.84
Wisconsin 11.30 11.73 11.25 12.18
Order: second −10.77 9.649 −10.99 10.02
Order: third −18.64∗ 10.25 −17.73∗ 10.68
Order: fourth −26.20∗∗ 13.33 −18.98 15.36
N 162 162
R2 0.325 0.272
F statistic 8.140 p = 0.00 7.250 p = 0.00
(d.o.f) (9, 152) (9, 152)
Hausman test statistic 1 (d.o.f.) 1.16 (9) p = 0.99
Hausman test statistic 2 (d.o.f.) 1.16 (1) p = 0.28
* = 10% level significance; ** = 5% level significance; *** = 1% level significance.
Table notes: sample is restricted to observations with nonzero introduction delay. The IV estimation
uses Federal Access Tariﬀ as an instrument for introduction delay. Hausman test statistic 1 tests all
coeﬃcients except the constant. Hausman test statistic 2 tests only the coeﬃcient for introduction
delay. D.o.f. is the degrees of freedom of the statistics.
Table 3 OLS and IV estimates for regulatory delay a
6 Alternative Explanations
The empirical work shows that discretionary regulatory delay is positively correlated
with introduction delay at the service-specific level, in accord with the theoretical model
presented here. In this section, I discuss a few competing explanations.
Let us first dispense with some conceptions of the interaction between the reg-
ulator and the firm that would lead to the opposite finding. One idea is that before the
firm oﬃcially submits a service to the regulator, there is unoﬃcial communication and
bargaining between the parties, so that the firm submits only “pre-approved” services
to the regulator. If so, then the division of total delay time s + a into innovation and
regulatory delay is arbitrary. In this case, however, there would either be no correlation
Cox Models for Regulatory Delay
Estimation 1 Estimation 2 Estimation 3
Hypothesis p-value p-value p-value
H0: βj ≥ 0 vs. HA: βj < 0
β1 for innovation delay ∈ [1,median] 0.333 0.364 0.258
β2 for innovation delay > median 0.046 0.077 0.006
Joint test: H0: β = 0 vs. HA: β 6= 0
β1 and β2 0.169 0.278 0.014
β1, β2, and β0 for innovation delay = 0 0.055 0.049 0.014
Table 4 Results of hypothesis tests
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between innovation and regulatory delay (if regulatory delay were pro-forma and varied
only due to the vagaries of the regulatory calendar) or negative correlation (if longer s
assured shorter a).
Another possibility is that the firm delays submitting a service to the regulator
while it performs “due diligence” tasks regarding cost-based pricing or other matters. If
the regulator does not know the propensity of the firm to introduce over-priced services,
but believes that firms that are more honest find it less costly to perform due diligence,
then a Spence-type signaling model would lead to honest firms taking more time to
introduce products than dishonest firms. The regulator would respond by taking more
time to examine services with little innovation delay, and the result would be negative
correlation between innovation and regulatory delay, the opposite of what the data show.
Other explanations could rationalize the empirical finding of positive correlation.
First, there may be unobserved service-specific factors that are positively correlated with
both types of delay. A candidate for this explanation is a service such as caller ID. When
phone companies first introduced caller ID, consumer privacy advocates objected, which
led to extended discussions about how the service would be oﬀered. The privacy con-
cern, an unobserved factor to the econometrician, may have delayed introduction of the
service as the phone companies reprogrammed the service to meet the objections of the
advocates, and also may have delayed regulatory approval due to lengthier regulatory
hearings. Caller ID, however, is not a typical service in this respect. Few telecommuni-
cations services garner any attention from the public before they are introduced. Fur-
thermore, if such unobserved factors were an important part of the regulatory approval
process, then innovation delay would be endogenous in the estimations for regulatory
delay. The statistical tests gave no evidence of such endogeneity. However, given that the
exact power of the tests cannot be known, unobservables remain a potential explanation.
There may be many other explanations for the correlation between innovation and
regulatory delay seen in the data. However, external evidence suggests that regulators
are becoming increasingly attuned to the costs of regulatory delay, so it is realistic to
assume that a firm would wish to communicate such costs to the regulator. Over the
last few decades, regulatory commissions (in some cases prodded by state legislatures)
have placed more emphasis on the benefits from new products. The older breed of regu-
latory oﬃcial, accustomed to tight regulatory control and a stable industry, viewed new
products with suspicion. As one regulator put it, “...regulation of telecommunications
remain essential to protect the public from deleterious consequences of innovation...”
(Oppenheim, 1991, p.310). Contrast this view with the more recent goals adopted by
regulators in the Ameritech region to “...facilitate the introduction of innovative new
services in this competitive marketplace.” (PSC of Wisconsin, 1998, p.47) This change
of attitude about the importance of new products to consumers and firms may make
regulators willing recipients of signals about the cost of delay.
7 Conclusions
This paper shows there is a robust positive relationship between the time until sub-
mission of a new product to the regulator and subsequent regulatory delay. The model
developed here suggests that the correlation may stem from the firm’s and the regula-
tor’s optimal choice of timing in response to the cost of regulatory delay. Whether under
complete or asymmetric information, with signaling taking place in the latter case, the
model predicts that shorter innovation delay will be rewarded with shorter regulatory
delay.
How much does the signaling matter? Consider the prediction from estimation 1 for
the eﬀect of changing innovation delay from one day to 2,441 days, the maximum in
19
the data: regulatory delay increases 215% (by 69 days), about one standard deviation
(s.d. = 71.1). The predicted percentage increases in regulatory delay from estimations 2
and 3 are even greater (293% and 237%, respectively). Thus, innovation delay has the
potential to shift regulatory delay a significant amount. While the welfare cost of the
delay cannot be estimated without price and quantity data, demand for voice mail may
provide a comparison. Hausman (1997) estimates that the compensating variation from
voice mail service averaged about $5 per subscriber in 1994, which was 8.2% of the av-
erage telephone expenditure (FCC, 1996). Voice mail undoubtedly has more subscribers
than most of the services in the present data. However, if the surplus per subscriber
for these services were similar, then while the absolute welfare cost of the additional
regulatory delay would be small, it would not be insignificant for aﬀected subscribers
relative to their telecommunications budget.
The theoretical model may also apply to other regulatory settings, such as the timing
of patenting and patent approval, or of pharmaceutical development and regulatory
approval. With minor modifications to the objective functions, the model may also
apply to decision-making within a firm, where the agents are the R&D division and
management, in place of the firm and the regulator, respectively. In this setting consumer
surplus would not enter management’s objective function. In each of these settings, there
is asymmetric information and the possibility of signaling and learning over time.
Some interesting extensions to the model deserve future attention. Taking the single-
firm, single-regulator theoretical model to the data required the assumption that there
are no strategic interactions among jurisdictions. However, many firms operate in mul-
tiple states. In the current formulation, actions undertaken in one jurisdiction have no
signaling value to regulators in the other jurisdictions. A logical next step for the model is
to expand the signaling game to include multiple receivers of the firm’s multiple signals.
Another extension would be to incorporate unregulated rivals into the model explic-
itly. The only impact of competition in the current model is indirect: it may aﬀect the
marginal cost of delay to the firm (θ) or the regulator’s benefits of delay (V ). Given that
local telecommunications competition was just getting oﬀ the ground during the period
studied, including competition in the model seems to be most useful for application
to future data sets. Finally, exploring the political economy of regulatory delay in the
telecommunications industry would be an interesting complement to the present work,
in which the regulator’s taste for delay is assumed but not derived.
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8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3 The limit of da/ds as θ ↓ θ− is given by limθ↓θ− (dα/dθ) / (dσ/dθ).
Since limθ↓θ− dσ/dθ = −∞ by the discussion after equation (11), it follows that da/ds,
which is positive by Proposition 2 tends to zero as θ falls to θ−. An increasing function
with a vanishing derivative at θ− must be concave at least in a neighborhood around
θ−.
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Statement and proof of Proposition 4
Proposition 4 σ(θ) < τ(θ) for θ ∈ (θ−, θ+). Innovation delay is smaller under signal-
ing than the full-information case.
From (11) we know the proposition holds in a neighborhood to the right θ−, so if
it does not hold for all types σ crosses τ from below at a type θ¯. But then pick a type
θ0 > θ¯ such that τ(θ0) ∈ σ([θ−, θ+]), and consider a deviation by a firm of type θ0 to
τ(θ0). Then the regulator infers (incorrectly) that the firm is of type θ00, where θ00 =
σ−1(τ(θ0)). By definition of τ it must be that Π˜(θ0, θ0, σ(θ0)) < Π˜(θ0, θ0, τ(θ0)). Also,
because ∂Π˜/∂θˆ > 0, we have Π˜(θ0, θ0, τ(θ0)) < Π˜(θ0, θ00, τ(θ0)). Thus, the firm of type
θ0 does better to play τ(θ0), and deviation to τ(θ−) cannot be credibly punished. Thus,
σ cannot cross τ .
The Mailath conditions In addition to the assumption that Π˜ is C2, the following con-
ditions are required to make use of Mailath’s (1987) results:
1. Belief monotonicity: ∂Π˜(θ, θˆ, s)/∂θˆ 6= 0. Here, ∂Π˜/∂θˆ = ∂Π∂a dadα dαdθˆ . Prop. 1 implies
that ∂Π/∂a 6= 0, da/da = 1, and equation (5) implies that dα/dθˆ 6= 0, so ∂Π˜/∂θˆ 6= 0.
2. Type monotonicity: ∂
2Π˜
∂s∂θ 6= 0. Here, ∂
2Π˜
∂s∂θ = −e−r(s+a)π0(θ) < 0.
3. Requirements of the full-information strategy:
(a) Existence and uniqueness: ∂Π˜(θ, θ, s)/∂s = 0 has unique solution in s, which
maximizes Π˜(θ, θ, s). Here, ∂Π˜∂s = 0 implies
rF (s)− F 0(s) = e−raπ(θ) (20)
Under the assumptions on F in footnote (5), a unique solution exists.
(b) “Strict” quasiconcavity. ∂
2Π˜(θ,θ,τ(θ))
∂s2 < 0. Evaluated at (θ, θ, τ(θ)), and using
equation (20), we have ∂
2Π˜
∂s2 = e
−rs (rF 0(s)− F 00(s)) < 0.






> k. In this application this condition does not hold, because (due
to the exponential terms in s) as s→∞, ∂Π˜(θ, θ, s)/∂s→ 0. However, this condition
is suﬃcient but not necessary, and is stronger than needed. The condition is used in
Mailath (1987) to bound the set S ={s ∈ R|∃θ such that Π˜(θ, θ, s) ≥ Π˜(θ, θ−, τ(θ−)}




−rF (τ(θ−)) + e−rα(θ−)π(θ)
´
¡
−rF (s) + e−rα(θ)π(θ)
¢ (21)
As s → ∞, the left side of inequality (21) goes to zero for arbitrary τ . As s → ∞,
the numerator on the right side of (21) is unaﬀected, the denominator has F (s)→ 0
and e−rα(θ)π(θ) > 0, and so the right side is a positive number bounded away from
zero. Thus, S is bounded above as required.
5. Initial condition: equation (11). Assume not: suppose σ is one-to-one and incentive
compatible but that σ(θ−) 6= τ(θ−). Consider a deviation by the firm of type θ− to
τ(θ−) . If τ(θ−) = σ(θ0) for some θ0 ∈ [θ−, θ+], then the regulator will infer (incor-
rectly) that the firm is of type θ0. By definition of τ it must be that Π˜(θ−, θ−, σ(θ−))
< Π˜(θ−, θ−, τ(θ−)). Also, because ∂Π˜/∂θˆ > 0, we have Π˜(θ−, θ−, τ(θ−)) < Π˜(θ−, θ0, τ(θ−)).
Thus, the firm does better to play τ(θ−). On the other hand, if τ(θ−) /∈ σ([θ−, θ+]),
then a sensible refinement such as the intuitive criterion can ensure that the regula-
tor holds the pessimistic belief that the firm’s type is θ−. If so, then (by definition
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of τ) the firm does no worse playing τ(θ−) than by playing σ(θ−). In either case,
then, deviation to τ(θ−) cannot be credibly punished. Thus, it must be that σ(θ−) =
τ(θ−).
6. Single crossing condition: ∂Π˜(θ,θˆ,s)/∂s
∂Π˜(θ,θˆ,s)/∂θˆ











Since neitherW nor U depend on θ, the relevant terms are [rF (s)− F 0(s)− e−raπ(θ)] /π(θ),
which has derivative in θ of − (rF (s)− F 0(s))π0(θ)/π(θ)2. This derivative has the
sign of −rF (s) + F 0(s) < 0. So the single crossing condition is satisfied, as asserted
in (7).
